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Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client: 
How Does It Impact Audit Quality? 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: Using a large sample of audit client firms, this paper investigates whether 
and how the geographic proximity between auditor and client affects audit quality proxied 
by accrual-based earnings quality. We define an auditor as a local auditor (1) if the 
auditor’s practicing office is located in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as the 
client's headquarters and (2) if the geographic distance between the two cities where the 
auditor’s practicing office and the client’s headquarters are located is within 100 
kilometers or they are in the same MSA. As predicted, our empirical results are consistent 
with local auditors providing higher-quality audit services than non-local auditors. In 
addition, as predicted, this quality difference is weakened for diversified clients with more 
operating or geographic segments. The results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that informational advantages associated with local audits 
enable auditors to better constrain management’s biased earnings reporting, with greater 
advantages for less diversified clients. 
 
JEL classification: M42 
 
Keywords: Auditor locality, geographic proximity, audit quality, diversification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Enron debacle and the subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen, 
regulators, lawmakers, academic researchers, and the popular press have paid considerable 
attention to engagement-specific factors determining the auditor–client relationship and 
their impact on audit quality. The focus of this study is on a new engagement-specific 
factor that may play an important role in the development of the auditor–client relationship: 
geographic proximity between auditor and client, or auditor locality. Specifically, we 
examine whether the geographic distance between auditor and client plays a role in 
determining audit quality. 
This study is motivated by a growing body of literature in accounting and finance 
that documents the importance of geographic proximity between economic agents (e.g., 
DeFond et al. 2011; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; Malloy 2005). This strand of research 
suggests that geographic proximity lowers the information asymmetry between economic 
agents by facilitating information flows and monitoring. Building upon the implication 
from this recent literature, we expect that local auditors possess an informational 
advantage over non-local auditors because proximity to clients can facilitate the 
acquisition of more idiosyncratic client information, such as client-specific incentives, 
means, and opportunities for substandard reporting. We posit that this informational 
advantage attenuates managerial opportunism in financial reporting because greater client-
specific knowledge enables auditors to better identify and reign in aggressive reporting 
practices (Krishnan 2003; Myers et al. 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010). We expect, 
however, that this effect of auditor locality is weakened for diversified clients with more 
operating divisions or geographic segments, because the audit advantage associated with 
geographic proximity to client headquarters is likely to be smaller for such clients. 
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Informational advantages arising from geographic proximity are well documented 
in the contexts of portfolio decisions and investment performance (Baik et al. 2010; 
Bodnaruk 2009; Ivkovich and Weisbenner 2005), analysts’ forecasting decisions (Malloy 
2005), knowledge transfers (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Audretsch and Stephan 1996), 
and the monitoring and regulatory effectiveness of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (DeFond et al. 2011; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). If geographic 
proximity facilitates information transfers and monitoring, then auditors located closer to 
their clients should be better able to assess the clients’ incentives and abilities for 
opportunistic earnings management. Such client-specific knowledge is vital for auditors to 
plan audits effectively, to identify relevant audit risks, and to interpret audit evidence 
properly, which in turn helps them rely less on management’s subjective estimates when 
assessing accrual choices (Knechel et al. 2007). 
As in many other studies (e.g., Chung and Kallapur 2003; Frankel et al. 2002), we 
assert that biased earnings reporting can be used to draw inferences about audit quality, 
and we use accrual-based earnings quality measures as proxies for audit quality. As our 
main proxies for audit quality, we use two measures of discretionary accruals, which are 
estimated by using (1) the Ball–Shivakumar (2006) model, in which the asymmetric 
timeliness in recognition of gains versus losses is controlled for, and (2) the methodology 
of Kothari et al. (2005), in which the performance of matching firms is adjusted. To 
supplement these measures, we also use two additional measures of accrual quality: 
(3) one developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002) and 
(4) another developed by Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005, FLOS hereafter), 
which focuses on a discretionary component of accrual quality. We expect that local 
auditors with more client-specific knowledge are better able to deter their clients from 
engaging in aggressive accrual choices than non-local auditors. We therefore predict that 
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the clients of local auditors will exhibit lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals and 
higher levels of accrual quality relative to the clients of non-local auditors. 
Our empirical results using 12,439 firm–year observations collected over the years 
2002–2005 reveal the following. First, after controlling for a comprehensive set of 
variables known to affect the extent of opportunistic earnings management, we find that 
the clients of local auditors report a lower level of absolute discretionary accruals and a 
higher level of accrual quality compared to those of non-local auditors. Second, we find 
that these associations are relatively weaker or disappear for diversified clients with more 
operating and/or geographic segments. This evidence is consistent with the view that local 
audit advantages are greater when information transfers between a firm and its 
stakeholders, including auditors, occur mostly at the corporate headquarter level and 
auditors perform their audit work primarily at headquarters. For more diversified firms, a 
larger part of business operations are performed in multiple locations other than where the 
firms are headquartered. As a result, an auditor’s informational advantage associated with 
geographic proximity to headquarters is likely to diminish. Finally, our results are robust 
to controlling for potential self-selection bias associated with local versus non-local 
auditor choices and to restricting the sample only to the clients of audit offices engaging in 
both local and non-local audits. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that provides direct evidence that auditor–client 
geographic proximity is an important engagement-specific factor influencing audit quality. 
While the issue of geographic proximity between economic agents has been investigated 
in various contexts, no previous study has examined the issue in the context of audit 
quality, with the exception of DeFond et al. (2011). However, the focus of DeFond et al. 
(2011) is not on auditor–client geographic proximity but, rather, on the geographic 
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proximity between local audit offices and SEC regional offices. Evidence provided in our 
study fills this void and helps better understand the role of auditor–client geographic 
proximity in the development of the auditor–client relationship.  
Second, this study helps explain why large audit firms continue to expand their 
practicing offices to many cities. The results of this study suggest that decentralized local 
office structures reduce information asymmetries between clients and auditors, thereby 
allowing office-level auditors to improve client-specific knowledge. Finally, findings in 
this study will be of interest to regulators. Regulators have been concerned about whether 
a close relationship or social bonding between auditor and client is detrimental to the 
auditor’s objectivity. While some prior studies find that their cozy relationship impairs 
audit quality (e.g., Davis et al. 2009; Menon and Williams 2004), the results of this study 
suggest that proximity to clients, which likely increases social bonding, can be beneficial 
to audit quality. 
The next section reviews the extant literature and develops research hypotheses. 
The third section discusses variable measurements and empirical models. The fourth 
section describes our sample and presents descriptive statistics. The fifth section presents 
our empirical results. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
EXTANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
An audit firm typically provides audit services through a practicing office located 
near its clients. As noted by Francis et al. (1999), it is the local engagement offices, not the 
national headquarters of the audit firm, that ―contract for and oversee the delivery of 
audits‖ and ―issue audit reports for the clients who are headquartered in the same 
geographical locale.‖ In a related vein, former SEC commissioner Wallman (1996) 
emphasizes that auditing research should pay more attention to city-level (or office-level) 
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analyses rather than national-level analyses because local practicing offices make the most 
of audit decisions with respect to a particular client. 
The main focus of prior office-level studies has been on the questions of 
(1) whether auditor independence is impaired for the audits of large clients by individual 
audit offices (e.g., Chung and Kallapur 2003; Craswell et al. 2002; Reynolds and Francis 
2000), (2) whether auditor industry expertise is firm-wide or office specific (e.g., Ferguson 
et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010), and (3) whether audit quality is 
associated with the size of the audit engagement offices (e.g., Choi et al. 2010; Francis and 
Yu 2009, 2011). However, prior literature has devoted little attention to the role of 
auditor–client geographic proximity in determining audit quality. 
Research in financial economics provides evidence suggesting that geographic 
proximity between economic agents matters in explaining their decision-making behavior 
and contractual relationships. A growing body of the ―home or local bias‖ literature in 
finance finds that equity investors overweight domestic (or local) stocks in their portfolio 
choices, primarily because they are more familiar with domestic (or local) stocks and have 
advantages in obtaining information (Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Covrig et al. 2006; 
Ivkovich and Weisbenner 2005). This informational advantage also enables local 
individual and institutional investors to better monitor firms (Baik et al. 2010; Peterson 
and Rajan 2002) and to earn superior returns than non-local investors (Bodnaruk 2009; 
Coval and Moskowitz 2001; Ivkovich and Weisbenner 2005). Furthermore, Malloy (2005) 
reports that geographically proximate analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts 
than other analysts, suggesting that the former have an informational advantage over the 
latter. 
A few recent studies in accounting and auditing also examine issues related to 
geographic proximity between economic agents. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that 
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firms located closer to SEC regional offices are less likely to restate their prior years’ 
financial statements. The results of this study suggest that management’s assessment of ex 
ante misreporting costs is higher for firms located nearer to SEC regional offices because 
geographic proximity lowers information asymmetry and facilitates monitoring. DeFond 
et al. (2011) document that non-Big 4 audit offices located farther from SEC regional 
offices are less likely to issue going concern audit opinions, suggesting that non-Big 4 
auditors’ incentives to be independent are influenced by their geographic proximity to 
SEC regional offices. In sum, these studies indicate that geographic proximity mitigates 
information asymmetries and enhances monitoring effectiveness. 
In a similar vein, we argue that geographic proximity or auditor locality is 
associated with audit quality, because informational advantages arising from the proximity 
help auditors develop knowledge about client-specific characteristics, such as client 
incentives, abilities, and opportunities for opportunistic earnings management, and about 
client business risk that entails audit risks. Local auditors can develop such knowledge 
through various ways. For example, they can more easily obtain valuable private 
information about a client firm through informal talks with its executives, employees, 
suppliers, customers, and competitors.
1
 Local auditors can more frequently visit client 
firms and observe what goes on there directly at a lower cost. They are able to learn more 
about client-specific news from local media such as newspapers, radios, and TV stations. 
As local community constituents, they are more familiar with local regulations, business 
practices, and market conditions. Local auditors have natural opportunities to establish 
                                                 
1
 In terms of communicating with clients and others, we believe that geographic proximity will improve 
communication and information quality because it facilitates more face-to-face communication. Prior studies 
in psychology, communication, information systems, and organizational behavior suggest that face-to-face 
communication is more effective through the support for a higher level of interaction than other electronic 
forms of communication, such as e-mail and videoconferencing (e.g., Baltes et al. 2002; Doherty-Sneddon et 
al. 1997; Hambley et al. 2007; Hinds and Morensen 2005). Local auditors have clear advantages in face-to-
face communications with their clients and other stakeholders, compared with non-local auditors.  
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personal ties and social interactions with the executives of client firms. These 
opportunities are an important mechanism for information exchange (Hong et al. 2004), 
helping auditors to better evaluate their clients’ characteristics and incentives. 
Obtaining client-specific knowledge such as internal control structure and 
opportunities for substandard reporting is vital for auditors to plan audits effectively, to 
identify relevant audit risks, and to interpret audit evidence properly (Knechel et al. 
2007).
2
 For example, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) show that auditors adjust their audit 
planning when auditors perceive that a client has an increased risk of earnings 
management. Johnson et al. (2002) argue that adequate client-specific knowledge 
facilitates the detection of material errors and allows auditors to rely less on management 
estimates. Consistent with this argument, survey evidence of Carcello et al. (1992) 
suggests that knowledgeable audit teams, frequent communications between auditors and 
management, and frequent visits by the audit engagement partner and senior manager to 
an audit site are among the 10 highest rated attributes of audit quality. Moreover, prior 
studies suggest that auditors who gain client-specific knowledge through their extended 
tenure with specific clients (Myers et al. 2003) or industry specialization (Reichelt and 
Wang 2010) are better able to mitigate clients’ aggressive accrual choices. 
Based on the above arguments, we expect that auditor–client proximity helps 
auditors develop better knowledge about client-specific incentives, abilities, and 
opportunities for substandard reporting, leading to local auditors being more effective in 
                                                 
2
 For instance, superior knowledge of a client’s suppliers, customers, and employees will help auditors to 
verify management’s subjective attestation of accruals in accounts payable, accounts receivable, and payroll 
liabilities. Similarly, a better understanding of a client’s future strategic plans and the managers’ 
personalities and compensation schemes will help evaluate the risk of earnings management.  
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monitoring client reporting behavior and constraining biased financial reporting. Thus our 
first hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows.
3
 
H1: Audits performed by local auditors are of higher quality than audits 
performed by non-local auditors, other things being equal. 
We next posit that the positive association between auditor locality and audit 
quality is weaker for clients with more diversified structure. We use the corporate 
headquarters location as the client firm location. Corporate headquarters is likely to be the 
center of information exchange between the firm and its suppliers, service providers, and 
investors (Coval and Moskowitz 1999); thus auditors perform a substantial amount of 
audit work there. However, if a client firm has many operating divisions or geographic 
segments outside its headquarters, the local audit advantages discussed above will be 
attenuated. It will be difficult for auditors to visit all the divisions or segment offices of 
diversified firms scattered throughout the U.S. or other countries and to maintain close 
face-to-face communications with executives and other employees. As a result, we expect 
the relation between auditor locality and audit quality to be stronger for less diversified 
client firms because corporate headquarters generate relatively richer information for 
audits for such firms. To provide empirical evidence of this prediction, we test the 
following hypothesis (in alternative form). 
H2: The positive relation between auditor locality and audit quality is weaker for 
diversified clients with more operating divisions or geographic segments, other 
things being equal. 
 
                                                 
3
 In contrast to this view, the works of Gul et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2008) find that audit quality in 
China is, in general, lower for local than for non-local audits, because local auditors are subject to greater 
political influences of local governments, who are often the controlling shareholders of both local client 
firms and auditors. However, we do not expect such results to be applicable to the U.S. setting, where a high 
level of auditor independence is required and the ownership of local governments is minimal. Thus we do 
not formally develop this view as a competing hypothesis. 
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MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Definition of Local Auditors 
We use the location of the audit engagement office as the auditor location because 
it is an office-based engagement partner or audit team, and not the national headquarters, 
that actually administers individual audit contracts and issues audit opinions (Ferguson et 
al. 2003; Francis and Yu 2009, 2011). Following prior studies (Coval and Moskowitz 
1999; Francis et al. 2005; Pirinsky and Wang 2006), we use the location of corporate 
headquarters as the client firm location. We differentiate local auditors from non-local 
auditors in the following two ways. We first define an auditor as a local auditor if the 
audit engagement office is located in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where 
audit clients are headquartered (DMSA = 1), and as a non-local auditor otherwise (DMSA 
= 0). 
We adopt this MSA-based differentiation because an MSA can be viewed as a 
reasonable geographic boundary in which most social and economic interactions between 
community members take place. However, this MSA-level differentiation does not take 
into account the actual geographic distance between auditor and client. Some MSAs are 
located within a narrow geographic boundary, particularly in the eastern U.S., while 
several MSAs in some western states are much larger than those in the eastern states. As a 
result, some client headquarters can be more proximate to audit offices in adjacent MSAs 
than those in the same MSA. For this reason, we also adopt an alternative approach in 
which an auditor is defined as a local auditor if the audit engagement office is located 
within 100 kilometers from the client’s headquarters or if both the audit office and client 
headquarters are located in the same MSA (D100 = 1), and as a non-local auditor 
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otherwise (D100 = 0).
4
 We choose 100 kilometers as the cut-off value following Coval 
and Moskovitz (2001), Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), and Malloy (2005). Similar to these 
studies, we consider any distance within 100 kilometers to be a reasonable commute to 
work.
5
 
Measurement of Audit Quality 
Prior studies often use either accruals or audit opinions to proxy for audit quality. 
This study uses accruals rather than audit opinions to proxy for audit quality for the 
following reasons: Audit opinion is an extreme measure of audit quality because modified 
opinions comprise only a small proportion of audit opinions, and thus, unlike accrual-
based measures, audit opinions do not address audit quality differentiation for a broad 
cross section of firms (Myers et al. 2003).
6
 As a result, there is little cross-sectional 
variation in audit opinions, which can lead to a lack of statistical power in empirical tests. 
                                                 
4
 We use the indicator variables (DMSA and D100) rather than a continuous variable to capture the distance 
between the audit office and the client’s headquarters for two reasons: First, since we compute the distance 
between the centers of the two cities where the auditor office and client headquarters are located, due to data 
limitations (see footnote 14 for more details), analyses with a continuous variable will introduce more noise 
into our tests, particularly when the auditor office and client headquarters are located in the same city. 
Second, the effect of geographic proximity may not differ significantly within a distance short enough to 
commute regularly. Consistent with our expectations, our untabulated results show that the continuous 
variable of distance is significant only when the distance is over and beyond a certain threshold. In addition, 
the models using the indicator variable demonstrate higher explanatory power in our empirical analyses than 
those using the continuous variable of distance. 
5
 The validity of the D100 measure can be harmed by variations in population density, traffic conditions, 
availability of public transportation, and its definition of combined factors. We performed several sensitivity 
checks to mitigate the concern. First, we used 150, 200, and 250 kilometers to determine a combined 
variable for MSA-based and distance-based measures. Second, we used pure distance-based indicator 
variables. Third, we used state-based differentiation, as in Baik et al. (2010). The results of these sensitivity 
analyses are qualitatively similar to the tabulated results with respect to the variable of interests in most 
cases. Thus, the inferences remain unchanged. Footnote 23 explains exceptional cases when the results of 
the alternative proxies are different from the tabulated results where appropriate. In general, we find that the 
use of an MSA-based measure yields more significant results than the use of distance-based measures, which 
implies that an MSA represents a more reasonable economic boundary that permits variations in locality 
characteristics.  
6
 In addition, auditors are less likely to compromise their audit opinions due to their concerns over legal 
liability, while they are more likely to tolerate biased reporting of earnings because failures to detect biased 
accruals have less of an impact on an auditor’s legal liability compared with failures to issue appropriate 
audit opinions (DeFond et al. 2002). This may be a reason why DeFond et al. (2011) fail to find any 
significant relation between auditor–client distance and the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern 
audit opinion in their untabulated analyses. We tried to replicate this test and found the same result. 
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As in many other studies, we view absolute discretionary (abnormal) accruals (DA) 
as an outcome of opportunistic earnings management. It is well known that the traditional 
DA measure using the Jones (1991) model is noisy (Dechow et al. 1995). To alleviate this 
concern, we use two alternative measures of DA: One is obtained from the augmented 
Jones model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006), which takes into account the asymmetric 
timeliness in gain versus loss recognition, and the other is estimated by the performance-
matched modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). We denote these two measures as 
DA1 and DA2, respectively. 
The augmented Jones model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) in Eq. (1) explains the 
computation of our first measure, DA1: 
         
jt
jt jt-1 1 jt-1 2 jt jt-1 3 jt jt-1
4 jt jt-1 5 jt 6 jt-1 jt jt
ACCR / A = β [1 / A ] + β [ΔREV / A ] + β [PPE / A ]
+β [CFO / A ] + β DCFO + β [(CFO / A )* DCFO ] +ε
 (1)      
where, for firm j and year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals (income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations); A, ΔREV, and PPE represent total 
assets, changes in net sales, and gross property, plant, and equipment, respectively; CFO 
represents cash flows from operations; DCFO is an indicator variable that equals one if 
CFO is negative, and zero otherwise; and ε is the error term. We estimate Eq. (1) for each 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry and year with at least 10 
observations. Our first measure of abnormal accruals, DA1, is the difference between 
actual total accruals deflated by lagged total assets and the fitted values of Eq. (1). 
Our second measure of abnormal accruals, DA2, is computed as follows. For each 
two-digit SIC industry and year with at least 10 observations, we estimate the cross-
sectional version of the modified Jones model as 
   jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt APPEARECREVAAACCR    ]/[]/)[(]/1[/    1312111    (2) 
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where the residuals are DA before adjusting for firm performance. Following the 
procedures proposed by Kothari et al. (2005), we match each firm–year observation with 
another from the same two-digit SIC industry with the closest return on assets (ROA) in 
each year. We then compute performance-matched abnormal accruals, DA2, by taking the 
difference between the unadjusted DA and the ROA-matched firm’s DA. 
To supplement two discretionary accrual measures, we also employ the accrual 
quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols 
(2002). Dechow and Dichev (2002) view that accruals are of high quality if they map into 
past, current, and future cash flows effectively. McNichols (2002) suggests that including 
the original Jones model variables (i.e., ΔREV and PPE) in the Dechow–Dichev model 
improves the performance of estimation. Thus, we obtain this accrual quality measure by 
calculating the time series standard deviation of residuals from a cross-sectional regression 
estimated from the following equation 
1 2 1 3 3 1 4 5    jt jt jt jt jt jt jtWCA CFO CFO CFO REV PPE                     (3) 
where, for firm j and year t (or t - 1), ∆WCA represents change in working capital.
7
 All 
the variables above are deflated by average total assets. Equation (3) is estimated for each 
two-digit SIC code industry with at least 10 observations in a given year. Then we 
calculate the standard deviation of residuals υjt, termed AQ1 for each firm over the years t - 
4 to t. The larger the standard deviation of residuals, the greater the noise in earnings and 
the lower the quality of earnings. Hence AQ1 is considered an inverse measure of audit 
quality. 
                                                 
7
 Here ∆WCA is defined as -(∆AR + ∆INV + ∆AP + ∆TAX + ∆OTH), where ∆AR is change in receivables, 
∆INV is change in inventory, ∆AP is change in payables, ∆TAX  is change in tax payable, and ∆OTH is 
change in other assets. 
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It is suggested by FLOS that poor accrual quality can be due to innate features of a 
firm’s business model, such as its operating environment and complexity of transactions, 
or it could be due to discretionary factors such as managerial accounting choices and 
accrual manipulation. Since the innate factors of AQ1 are mainly driven by a client firm’s 
operating environment, audit quality could be better proxied by the discretionary factors of 
AQ1. For this reason, we decompose AQ1 into innate and discretionary components based 
on the approach outlined in FLOS
8
 and use the discretionary component, termed AQ2, as 
an alternative proxy for audit quality. 
Empirical Model for Testing the Effect of Auditor Locality on Audit Quality 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regression model that links the 
magnitude of absolute abnormal accruals with our variable of interest, that is, auditor 
locality, and other control variables known to affect the extent of earnings management: 
          
jt 0 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt jt 4 jt
5 jt 6 jt 7 jt 8 jt 9 jt
10 jt 11 jt 12 jt 13 jt 14 jt 15 jt
16 jt 17 jt
| DA| = α +α DLOCAL +α LNBGS +α DLOCAL * LNBGS +α LNTA
+α BIG4 +α TENURE +α NAS +α INDSPEC +α CHGSALE
+α BTM +α LOSS +α LEV +α ZMIJ +α ISSUE +α CFO
+α LAGACCR +α CONCENT +(Indu jtstry &Year Indicators)+ ε
        (4) 
where, for firm j in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Absolute abnormal 
accruals, denoted by |DA|, are our proxy for the extent of opportunistic earnings 
management. Here DLOCAL proxies for auditor locality or auditor–client geographic 
proximity, and this variable is either DMSA or D100. The variable LNBGS represents the 
natural log of the sum of the number of business and geographic segments minus one. If 
business or geographic segment data for a given observation are missing from Compustat, 
we assign it a value of one, following Francis and Yu (2009). Thus, the minimum LNBGS 
is zero (i.e., log(2 - 1) = 0). Since the α1 coefficient measures only the partial effect of 
                                                 
8
 Specifically, we regress the firm-specific standard deviation of residuals υjt from Eq. (3) over the years t - 4 
to t (AQ1) on firm size (market capitalization), cash flow volatility, sales volatility, operating cycle, and loss 
proportion following Eq. (8) of FLOS. The predicted values from this estimation capture the innate 
component while unexplained portions (the residuals) capture the discretionary component.  
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DLOCAL on |DA| when LNBGS is equal to zero, we also estimate Eq. (4) after excluding 
DLOCAL*LNBGS from the model. A negative coefficient on DLOCAL in such estimation 
indicates that clients of local auditors, on average, report a lower level of absolute 
discretionary accruals than those of non-local auditors, consistent with our first hypothesis. 
For further evidence, we also test the coefficient of DLOCAL at each quartile value of 
LNBGS. Our second hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction between 
DLOCAL and LNBGS in Eq. (4), consistent with the local audit advantages being weaker 
for more operationally or geographically diversified clients. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
Equation (4) includes many control variables that are known to affect the 
magnitude of earnings management. We include LNTA to control for the client size effect 
(e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). Several studies show that Big 4 auditors and industry 
specialists are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors and non-specialists, respectively, in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; Krishnan 2003).
9
 We 
include BIG4 and INDSPEC to control for the effect of auditor brand name at the national 
level and industry expertise at the MSA level, respectively. We include TENURE because 
Johnson et al. (2002) and Myers et al. (2003) provide evidence that clients of longer-
tenure auditors report lower abnormal accruals. We include NAS to control for the effect of 
non-audit fees on audit quality (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Frankel 
et al. 2002). The variables BTM and CHGSALE are included to control for firm growth, 
while LOSS is included to control for potential differences in earnings management 
                                                 
9
 In contrast, Louis (2005) suggests that non-Big 4 auditors may provide better-quality audit service to small 
clients. We also add an indicator variable for the middle four second-tier auditors in both Eqs. (4) and (5). 
Prior studies by Hogan and Martin (2009) and Boone et al. (2010) suggest that second-tier auditors behave 
differently from top-tier auditors and other small auditors. Because we obtain qualitatively similar results 
after including this indicator variable, we do not tabulate them for simplicity. Based on p ≤ 10% (two tailed) 
as a cut-off for the significance level, this paper defines ―qualitatively similar‖ to mean that in Eqs. (4) and 
(5), (1) the coefficient on DLOCAL is negative and significant and (2) the coefficient of DLOCAL*LNBGS is 
positive and significant. 
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between loss and profit firms. We also include ZMIJ and ISSUE to control for the effects 
of financial distress (Reynolds and Francis 2000) and financing transactions (Teoh et al. 
1998) on earnings management, respectively. The variable LEV is included because highly 
levered firms may have greater incentives for earnings management due to their concerns 
of debt covenant violations (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). We include 
CFO to control for the potential correlation between accruals and cash flows (Kothari et 
al. 2005). As in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kim et al. (2003), we include LAGACCR to 
control for the reversal of accruals over time. The variable CONCENT is included to 
control for the effect of auditor concentration on our results (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; 
Kallapur et al. 2010).
10
 Finally, we include industry and year indicators to control for 
possible variations in accounting standards and regulations across industries and over 
years. Each industry is defined based on two-digit SIC codes. 
Next, when AQ is used as the proxy for audit quality, we estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
jt 0 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt jt 4 jt
5 jt 6 jt 7 jt 8 jt 9 jt
10 jt 11 jt 12 jt jt
AQ = β + β DLOCAL + β LNBGS + β DLOCAL * LNBGS + β LNTA
+ β BIG4 + β OPCYCLE + β STD_CFO + β STD_SALE + β NAS
+ β INDSPEC + β ZMIJ + β CFO +(Industry &Year Indicators)+ε
    (5) 
where, for firm j in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1. We add OPCYCLE, 
STD_CFO, and STD_SALE to Eq. (5) because Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that a 
longer operating cycle and greater operating volatility are associated with higher accrual 
estimation errors. We also add in Eq. (5) several other control variables (NAS, INDSPEC, 
ZMIJ, and CFO) included in Eq. (4) that are deemed to be associated with accrual 
                                                 
10
 When we measure CONCENT using audit fees rather than the number of clients, we obtain qualitatively 
similar results. 
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quality.
11
 Our variables of interest, DLOCAL and DLOCAL*LNBGS, are the same as in 
Eq. (4). 
 
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample 
The initial list of our sample consists of all firms included in the Audit Analytics 
database for the four-year period 2002–2005. We extract data on the state/city locations of 
auditors’ practicing offices and client firms’ headquarters from the Audit Analytics 
database.
12
 Since an MSA consists of one or more counties, we match their city-level 
locations to the county codes of Federal Information Processing Standards using the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s 2000 Places file and identify whether or not the practicing office of the 
auditor and the client’s headquarters are located in the same MSA. Following Francis et al. 
(2005), we delete observations if auditors or clients are not located in one of the 280 
MSAs defined in the U.S. census of 2000.
13
 Next, we obtain the latitude and longitude 
data for the cities of the practicing offices of auditors and the headquarters of client firms 
using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 2001 City–State file. With these data, we 
compute the actual geographic distances between the (centers of) two cities where auditor 
offices and client headquarters are located.
14
 
                                                 
11
 Alternatively, we repeat the tests after including in Eq. (5) all the control variables used in Eq. (4). 
Untabulated results for the variables of interest are qualitatively identical to those tabulated in this study and 
all statistical inferences remain unchanged. 
12
 While Compustat reports only the current state/county codes of firms’ headquarters, Audit Analytics 
updates the information on the state/city locations of client headquarters on an annual basis. Thus, we use the 
Audit Analytics database to identify client firm locations. 
13
 In our initial sample, we find 485 observations for which auditor or client headquarters are not located in 
any of the MSAs. Applying this selection criterion, we remove all firms that are located in a remote area in 
which local auditors hardly exist. As a sensitivity check, we repeat our analyses after including these 
observations and treating them as (1) DMSA = 1, (2) DMSA = 0, or (3) DMSA =1 or 0, following the 
definition of D100. We find, however, that the inclusion of these observations in our sample does not alter 
our statistical inferences for any of the three cases.   
14
 When the auditor’s practicing office and the client’s headquarters are in the same city, the distance is 
calculated as zero. It is possible that the effect of auditor locality is stronger when the two offices are located 
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We also obtain non-audit fees data from the Audit Analytics database. We retrieve 
all other financial data from the Compustat Industrial annual file. We exclude financial 
institutions and utility firms with SIC codes in the ranges 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, 
respectively. After applying the above selection procedures and data requirements, we 
obtain 12,439 firm–year observations located in 192 MSAs. These observations are 
audited by auditors from 767 unique audit practice offices located in 110 MSAs. The 
sample size for the tests using Eq. (5) decreases by almost a half, to 6,640, due to further 
data requirements. 
The Appendix provides information on the locations of clients and auditors in our 
full sample. Column (1) of Panel A of the Appendix reports the number of clients (firm–
year observations) in each MSA where more than 100 clients are located. Column (2) 
reports the number of local audits performed by audit offices located in the same MSA as 
their clients. Column (3) shows the average percentage of local audits in each MSA. The 
percentage varies across MSAs, suggesting that the choice of non-local auditors is not 
concentrated in certain MSAs. We find that about 80% of audits are carried out by 
auditors located in the same MSA, and about 83% are by auditors located within 100 
kilometers. Accordingly, only about 3% of firms are audited by auditors located within 
100 kilometers but not in the same MSA. There are not many cases (only 62 observations, 
reported in the bottom row of Panel A of the Appendix) where auditors are located in the 
same MSA as their clients but farther than 100 kilometers away from the clients’ 
headquarters. Panel B reports the number of observations by the distance between the 
audit office and client headquarters when they are not located in the same MSA. It is clear 
                                                                                                                                                   
within a shorter distance within the city, but data unavailability limits such analyses (i.e., no street-level 
addresses for auditors’ office are available in the Audit Analytics database). For more details on distance 
computation, see Coval and Moskowitz (1999). 
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from Panel B that some auditors are located nearby even though they are not in the same 
MSA as their client firms. 
Panel C of the Appendix provides more detailed auditor location information for 
1,691 clients located in the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island MSA. 15  It 
shows that about 15% of the clients in the MSA hire auditors from other MSAs, and about 
13% of the clients hire auditors located farther than 100 kilometers from their headquarters. 
It is noteworthy that some clients in the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island 
MSA hire auditors located far away, such as from the San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose 
MSA (4,120 kilometers away on average), the Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County 
MSA (3,949 kilometers away), and the Denver–Boulder–Greeley MSA (2,644 kilometers 
away).
16
 In contrast, some auditors come from nearby MSAs, such as the Hartford MSA 
(69 kilometers away) and the Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City MSA (73 kilometers 
away). These auditors are likely to share the characteristics of the local auditors to the 
client firms even though they are not located in the same MSA. This is why we define 
D100 as a combined variable of the distance-based and MSA-based measures and use it 
(in addition to DMSA, which is an MSA-based measure) to proxy for local audits. 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our two discretionary 
accrual measures, |DA1| and |DA2|, and two accrual quality measures, AQ1 and AQ2, 
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 We choose the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island MSA, for example, because the number of 
client firms located in this MSA is the largest of our sample.  
16
 To check if there exist any special reasons to hire long-distance, non-local auditors, we choose the state of 
California (where the state-by-state sample size is the largest) and identify clients that hire auditors located 
at least 300 miles away from client headquarters. We find that 50 client firms (101 observations) belong to 
this category. For these firms, we search for 10-Ks from the EDGAR database to see if these firms have 
special connections with the states in which their auditors are located. We find that, out of 50 client firms, 16 
have other major offices or plants (except for headquarters) in the states where their auditors are located and 
four moved their headquarters to California from different states but continued to hire their previous auditors. 
However, we have been unable to find any compelling evidence that the remaining 30 clients have any 
special connections to the states in which their auditors are located.  
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separately, for the local auditor sample (DMSA = 1 or D100 = 1) and the non-local auditor 
sample (DMSA = 0 or D100 = 0), along with univariate test results for differences in the 
mean and median between the two samples. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, both |DA1| 
and |DA2| are significantly lower for the clients of local auditors than for those of non-
local auditors. For example, the mean (median) value of |DA1| is 0.0846 (0.0473) for the 
clients of local auditors located in the same MSA, and 0.1046 (0.0570) for those of non-
local auditors located in a different MSA. The differences are significant at the 1% level (t 
= -7.90). We also find similar differences for the accrual quality measures. 
 [ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE! ] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all other variables included 
in our main regressions. The sample firms have 3.5 business or geographic segments on 
average (LNBGS = 0.9170). The average client size (LNTA) is 12.2340, which is 
equivalent to about $200 million of total assets. About 77% of clients are audited by one 
of the Big 4 auditors (BIG4), and the average logged auditor tenure (TENURE) is 1.8410, 
which is interpreted as about six years of auditor tenure. On average, non-audit service 
fees (NAS) are about 67% of total fees, and about 44% of clients hire industry specialists 
(INDSPEC). The distributions of the other variables are also shown in Panel B of Table 2. 
When the descriptive statistics in Panel B are compared with other studies on audit office-
level analyses, we find that ours are quite comparable to those of Choi et al. (2010) and 
Francis and Yu (2009). 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables 
included in Eq. (4). The two abnormal accrual measures, |DA1| and |DA2|, are highly 
correlated with the correlation coefficient of 0.445 (p < 0.01). The auditor locality 
indicator, DMSA and D100, is negatively correlated with |DA1| and |DA2| (p < 0.01 for 
both). Both |DA1| and |DA2| are significantly correlated with many control variables, 
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supporting their inclusion as control variables. Finally, we note that the correlations 
between the control variables are mostly not very high except for those between BIG4 and 
LNTA (0.547) and between NAS and LNTA (0.436). This finding suggests that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem. 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE! ] 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables included 
in Eq. (5), which can be summarized as follows: First, as expected, the two accrual quality 
metrics, AQ1 and AQ2, are highly correlated with each other. Second, both accrual quality 
metrics are negatively correlated with our measures of auditor locality, DMSA and D100, 
which is consistent with the results of univariate tests (as reported in Panel A of Table 2). 
Third, control variables are highly correlated with our accrual quality measures. Finally, 
consistent with the findings in Panel A of Table 3, the correlations between our control 
variables are mostly not very high except for those between BIG4 and LNTA (0.520) and 
between NAS and LNTA (0.436). 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Main Results Using Discretionary Accrual Measures 
 Table 4 reports the results of the regression in Eq. (4): In section A (B), |DA1| 
(|DA2|) is used as the dependent variable. All reported t-statistics are on an adjusted basis, 
using standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. As 
shown in columns (1a) and (3a), we first estimate Eq. (4) after excluding 
DLOCAL*LNBGS from the model. The coefficients on DMSA and D100 are both negative 
and significant (-0.0046 with t = -1.77 and -0.0050 with t = -1.73) at the 10% level in two-
 22 
tailed tests.
17
 These results are consistent with H1, that local auditors are, on average, 
more effective than non-local auditors in deterring opportunistic earnings management or 
biased financial reporting. These results should be interpreted cautiously, however, 
because the omission of DLOCAL* LNBGS can create a potential problem of correlated 
omitted variables. In what follows, we test our H1 and H2 using the results of estimating 
the full model in Eq. (4). 
When we include DLOCAL*LNBGS in the model, the coefficients on both DMSA 
and D100 remain all significantly negative, as shown in columns (2a), (4a), (1b), and (2b). 
Furthermore, the interaction term between DLOCAL and LNBGS is positive and 
significant across all columns in both sections A and B of Table 4; for example, in column 
(2a), the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 5% level 
(0.0086 with t = 2.45). These results support H2, implying that the effect of local audits on 
audit quality is weaker for more diversified client firms.
18
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE! ] 
 To further examine the validity of H1, we investigate whether the clients of local 
auditors report a lower level of discretionary accruals at different levels of firm 
diversification. When we set the value of LNBGS at the 25th percentile (LNBGS = 0 from 
Panel B of Table 2), the coefficient on DMSA and DMSA*LNBGS in column (2a) of 
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 When |DA2| is used as the dependent variable in the model excluding DLOCAL*LNBGS, the coefficients 
on DMSA and D100 are -0.0037 (t = -1.49) and -0.0028 (t = -1.15). While the coefficient on DMSA is 
significant with p = 0.0685 in a one-tailed test, the coefficient on D100 is insignificant. 
18
 To examine whether local audits constrain either or both income-increasing and income-decreasing 
accruals, we split the full sample into two subsamples, with income-increasing (positive) and income-
decreasing (negative) accruals (i.e., DA1 > 0 and DA1 < 0), and then estimate Eq. (4) separately. 
Untabulated results suggest that the coefficients on DLOCAL and DLOCAL*LNBGS are significant with 
predicted signs when we use the subsample of income-increasing accruals. However, when we use the 
subsample of income-decreasing accruals, both coefficients are insignificant, although they have the 
expected signs. These results suggest that informational advantages associated with local audits are related to 
more accurate accruals in general, but the effect is stronger for reducing income-increasing accruals. This 
finding is not very surprising, because auditors tend to be more concerned about their clients’ income-
increasing accruals (Kim et al. 2003).   
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Table 4 is translated into -0.0119 (-0.0119 + [0.0086 * 0] = -0.0119). This implies that 
discretionary accruals of clients of local auditors are lower than those of clients of non-
local auditors by 0.0119, when the value of LNBGS is equal to its 25th percentile value. 
However, when we set the value of LNBGS at the 50th (LNBGS = 1.0986), 75th
 
(LNBGS = 
1.6094), or 99th (LNBGS = 2.4849) percentile value, we fail to find significant differences 
in the level of discretionary accruals between local and non-local auditors. As reported in 
the bottom three rows of Table 4, the F-test result for the sum of the coefficients on 
DLOCAL and DLOCAL*LNBGS times the 50th, 75th, or 99th percentile value of LNBGS 
is not significant at the 10% level. The results using the estimated coefficients in other 
columns are qualitatively identical. These results suggest that local auditors perform 
higher-quality audit services than non-local auditors, but only for relatively less diversified 
clients.
19
 
To examine the economic significance of our results, we translate the estimated 
coefficients of the variables of interest into the magnitude of absolute discretionary 
accruals as a percentage of lagged total assets and calculate the percentage difference 
between local and non-local audits, using the estimated coefficients reported in column 
(2a) of Table 4. The estimated coefficient on DMSA, -0.0119, and that on DMSA*LNBGS, 
0.0086, mean that, on average, the clients of local auditors exhibit an approximately 4% 
lower level of absolute discretionary accruals than those of non-local auditors when we set 
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 To further explore this issue, we form four subsamples based on the number of segments (i.e., firms with 
two segments (one business segment and one geographic segment), three segments, four or five segments, 
and six or more segments). We then estimate Eq. (4), after excluding LNBGS and DLOCAL*LNBGS, for 
each of four subsamples. When DMSA is used as DLOCAL and the dependent variable is |DA1|, the 
coefficient on DMSA is equal to -0.0123 (t = -2.56) for the subsample of firms with two segments (4,272 
observations). However, the coefficient is not significant for all other subsamples. For example, the 
coefficient is -0.0004 (t = -0.10) for the subsample of firms with six or more segments (3,321 observations). 
When we perform additional analyses for firms with seven or more segments, eight or more segments, and 
nine or more segments, the results show that the coefficient on DMSA is insignificant, with a negative sign 
for each of these subsamples.  
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all the other variables to their respective mean values.
20
 For relatively more diversified 
firms (LNBGS = 1.6094, which is the 75th percentile value of the variable), local audits 
yield a lower level of absolute discretionary accruals by about 3%, whereas for less 
diversified firms (LNBGS = 0, which is the 25th percentile value), local audits yield a 
lower absolute discretionary accruals by about 12% compared with those of non-local 
audits. The 9% difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles suggests that the effect of 
local audits varies substantially with the level of firm diversification. 
The coefficients on the control variables are, overall, in line with the evidence 
reported in prior earnings management research. The coefficient on LNBGS is negative 
and significant, suggesting that diversified firms with relatively stable operations have 
higher earnings quality. The coefficient on LNTA is highly significant, with a negative 
sign across all four columns, suggesting that large client firms tend to engage in earnings 
management to a lesser extent than small client firms (Dechow and Dichev 2002). The 
coefficient on BIG4 is significantly negative in all specifications, suggesting that Big 4 
auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in constraining aggressive earnings 
management. The coefficient on BTM (CHGSALE) is significantly negative (positive), 
which suggests that high-growth firms manage earnings more aggressively. The 
coefficients on LOSS and ZMIJ are significant with an expected positive sign in most 
cases, suggesting that client firms in financial distress are more likely to engage in 
earnings management. Consistent with evidence reported in previous research (e.g., 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2003), the coefficients on CFO and LAGACCR have a 
negative sign. Finally, consistent with the findings in Kallapur et al. (2010), the auditor 
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 The average magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals as a percentage of lagged total assets estimated 
from the coefficients reported in column (2a) is 0.1039 for the clients of non-local auditors and 0.0999 for 
the clients of local auditors when we set all the other variables at their respective mean values. 
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concentration measure is negatively associated with the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals. 
As robustness checks, we re-estimate Eq. (4), using the performance-unadjusted 
abnormal accruals as the dependent variable—that is, using the modified Jones model in 
Eq. (2), as specified in Dechow et al. (1995). We also run the median regression and year-
by-year regressions after excluding year indicators. We also repeat the tests using various 
subsamples. Though not tabulated, the results from these robustness checks are, overall, 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.
21
 
Main Results Using Accrual Quality Measures 
We further examine whether local audits are related to the accrual quality of client 
firms. As explained earlier, we use both the accrual quality measure (AQ1) developed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002) and its discretionary 
component (AQ2) estimated based on the approach outlined in FLOS as proxies for audit 
quality. We then estimate the regression model in Eq. (5). Table 5 reports the regression 
results using the reduced sample of 6,640 firm–year observations. 
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 For example, for the regressions using the performance-unadjusted abnormal accruals and the median 
regression, the coefficients on DMSA for the regression in column (2a) of Table 4 are -0.0188 (t = -3.65) 
and -0.0091 (t = -4.80), respectively, and those on DMSA*LNBGS are 0.0127 (t = 3.31) and 0.0072 (t = 4.41), 
respectively. In year-by-year regressions, all four yearly regressions yield negative (positive) coefficients on 
DMSA (DMSA*LNBGS) and two (three) of them are significant at least at the 10% level. The average of the 
yearly coefficients on DMSA (DMSA*LNBGS) is -0.0123 (0.0087) and the corresponding Fama–MacBeth-
style t-statistic is 2.79 (2.46). We also perform several additional tests using various subsamples. First, we 
restrict our sample to the largest 100 MSAs in terms of population. Second, we use the median size of MSAs 
to classify large and small MSAs and repeat the analyses with both subsamples. Third, we divide the full 
sample into observations from the six largest MSAs and from the other MSAs and repeat the analyses with 
both subsamples. Fourth, we delete observations with auditors coming from cities located farther than 500 
(1,000) kilometers away and repeat the analyses. In sum, we find evidence consistent with the predictions of 
both H1 and H2 in all of these analyses. The coefficients on both DLOCAL and DLOCAL*LNBGS remain 
significant across almost all cases; the only exception is that we fail to find a significant coefficient on 
DLOCAL when we use observations from the six largest MSAs and DLOCAL is proxied by DMSA. 
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In Table 5, the coefficient on DLOCAL is negative and significant across all four 
columns.
22
 It also shows that the coefficients on DLOCAL*LNBGS are positive and 
significant in all columns. These results suggest that while auditor locality is associated 
with less noise in client accruals (i.e., greater accrual quality) in general, the association is 
weaker for clients with a more diversified business structure. These findings lend further 
support to the results reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficients of the control 
variables in Table 5 are generally consistent with those reported in Table 4, with the 
notable exception that the coefficient on CFO is positively (negatively) significant in 
Table 5 (Table 4). 
In addition, we use the absolute values of residuals from Eq. (5) to proxy for 
accrual quality, as suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and used by Srinidhi and Gul 
(2007), in untabulated analyses. Similar to the tabulated results, we find that the variables 
of interest are all significant. Overall, the results using our accrual quality measures, AQ1 
and AQ2, also support our hypotheses H1 and H2. Although not separately tabulated, we 
conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses and find that our results are robust to different 
regression methods and alternative measures of our test variables.
23
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE! ] 
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 When AQ1 [AQ2] is used as the dependent variable in the model excluding DLOCAL*LNBGS, the 
coefficients on DMSA and D100 are -0.0011 (t = -1.37) and -0.0013 (t = -1.44) [-0.0016 (t = -1.98) and -
0.0016 (t = -1.73)]. These coefficients are all significant at least at the 10% level in one-tailed tests.  
23
 For example, the coefficient on DMSA for the regression in column (1a) of Table 5 is -0.0028 (t = -1.82) 
and that on DMSA*LNBGS is 0.0021 (t = 1.69) for the median regression. In year-by-year regressions, all 
four yearly regressions yield negative (positive) coefficients on DMSA (DMSA*LNBGS) and two of them are 
significant at least at the 10% level. The average of the yearly coefficient on DMSA (DMSA*LNBGS) is -
0.0026 (0.0014) and the corresponding Fama–MacBeth-style t-statistics is 1.65 (1.90). We also perform 
several additional tests using various subsamples similar to those described in footnote 21. Most of these 
analyses reveal evidence consistent with the predictions of both H1 and H2. The only exceptions are that 
(1) the coefficients on DMSA and DMSA*LNBGS become insignificant when we use observations from the 
six largest MSAs, and (2) the coefficient on DLOCAL*LNBGS becomes insignificant when we use 150, 200, 
or 250 kilometers instead of 100 kilometers as cut-off values for the distance-based measure or the combined 
measure of both distance-based and MSA-based measures. 
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Further Analyses 
Our results so far are based on the full sample of 12,439 or 6,640 observations, 
depending on the dependent variables used. While this full sample consists of pooled 
client firms audited by all the audit offices in our dataset, it includes one group of auditors 
having both local and non-local clients and the other group having only local clients. One 
cannot therefore rule out the possibility that a systematic difference in audit quality exists 
between these two groups of auditors. In this case, our reported results may suffer from 
unknown confounding effects. To alleviate this concern, we obtain a more homogeneous 
sample of audit clients by restricting our sample to the clients of audit offices that engage 
in both local and non-local audits. We then re-estimate our regression models to see if the 
same audit office (which audits both local and non-local client firms) exhibits differential 
audit quality depending on its clients’ geographic location. 
We find that the empirical results for this subsample analysis are qualitatively 
similar to the tabulated results. For example, when we repeat the test equivalent to that 
reported in the column (2a) of Table 4 (n = 9,367 from 359 distinct audit offices of 95 
audit firms), the coefficients on DMSA and DMSA*LNBGS are -0.0078 (t = -1.66) and 
0.0066 (t = 1.88), respectively. When we repeat the test reported in column (1a) of Table 5 
(n = 5,045 from 319 distinct audit offices of 75 audit firms), the coefficients on DMSA and 
DMSA*LNBGS are -0.0020 (t = -1.47) and 0.0013 (t = 1.37), respectively. These results 
are significant at least at the 10% level in one-tailed tests. In sum, our results from the 
reduced sample reveal that, when auditors have both local and non-local clients, audit 
quality tends to be higher for local clients than for non-local clients, and this tendency is 
significantly weakened for more diversified clients. 
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Controlling for Potential Self-Selection Bias 
To address potential self-selection bias associated with local versus non-local 
auditor choices, we re-estimate our main regression models in Eqs. (4) and (5) by applying 
the Heckman-type (1979) two-stage treatment effect approach. Given that previous 
research has paid little attention to the issue of auditor locality, little is known about the 
factors that determine a client firm’s decision to appoint a local or non-local auditor. In an 
attempt to identify an initial list of potential determinants, we searched proxy statements, 
held discussions with auditors, and conducted an extensive review of the extant auditing 
literature. As a result, we first identified 13 variables (LNTA, LNBGS, LEV, LOSS, GCM, 
CAIN, ISSUE, INST, ANA, BIG4, NAS, NBIG, and WAGE) that are likely to influence local 
versus non-local auditor choices, for the first-stage probit auditor choice model. 
We expect a positive coefficient on LNTA, because large firms can easily hire local 
auditors, since auditors are less likely to turn away large clients in the same locale. We 
expect a negative coefficient on LNBGS because diversified firms are more likely to hire 
auditors from another MSA, since their plants, offices, or branches are more spread out to 
other regions. It would be more difficult for financially unhealthy clients to hire local 
auditors because local auditors, who are familiar with the financial problems of potential 
local clients, may be reluctant to audit them. In such a case, one would observe negative 
coefficients on leverage (LEV), the loss indicator (LOSS), and the going concern opinion 
indicator (GCM). If a client firm holds substantial long-term operating assets, more audit 
work would be required in the region where its factory/plant/warehouse is located rather 
than at its headquarters. Such a client is therefore less likely to appoint auditors near its 
headquarters. We therefore expect a negative coefficient on our capital intensity measure 
(CAIN). Firms that issue a significant amount of new equity or debt (ISSUE) have stronger 
incentives to manage earnings (Teoh et al. 1998). Such firms may be more likely to hire 
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non-local auditors for more aggressive earnings management. Since institutional investors 
demand higher-quality audits to enhance corporate monitoring (Han et al. 2008), client 
firms with higher institutional ownership (INST) may be more likely to appoint local 
auditors. Similarly, since analysts’ earnings forecast performance is related to audit quality 
(Behn et al. 2008), client firms with more analysts following (ANA) may feel more 
pressure to appoint local auditors. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on ISSUE to be 
negative and the coefficients on INST and ANA to be positive. 
Because Big 4 auditors have offices in many different MSAs, it is possible that the 
clients of Big 4 auditors will hire a Big 4 office in their own MSA rather than the same 
audit firm’s office in a different MSA. Thus, we expect a positive sign for BIG4. Because 
local auditors may be less likely to turn away clients that have a greater chance of 
procuring non-audit services, we expect a positive coefficient on NAS. If a client firm 
prefers a particular Big 4 audit firm, the likelihood of appointing a local Big 4 auditor will 
be greater when more Big 4 auditors are available in the MSA. We therefore expect a 
positive coefficient on NBIG (the number of Big 4 offices in the MSA). We include the 
mean hourly rate of auditor wages in each MSA (WAGE) to control for the effect of wage 
levels in an MSA in the likelihood of appointing local auditors.
24
 
With the determinants mentioned above, we estimate the following probit auditor 
choice model in Eq. (6) using two different dependent variables, namely, DMSA and D100. 
We find, however, that the estimated results using DMSA are qualitatively identical with 
                                                 
24
 On the one hand, if the audit fee level is high in an MSA, cost-conscious clients are less likely to appoint 
local auditors (Jensen and Payne 2005). On the other hand, quality-conscious clients are still likely to 
appoint local auditors to the extent that the higher fee level is accompanied by higher-quality audit services. 
We therefore do not predict a sign for the coefficient on WAGE. 
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those using D100. For brevity, we therefore report only the results of our probit estimation 
with DMSA as the dependent variable
25
: 
     DMSAjt
*
 = -2.3394 + 0.0040 LNTAjt + 0.022 LNBGSjt  – 0.0015 LEVjt 
                                  (13.53***)             (0.32)                      (0.76)                             (-0.05) 
                       – 0.0924 LOSSjt – 0.1921 GCMjt – 0.1823 CAINjt – 0.0773 ISSUEjt 
                                     (-2.87***)                  (-3.33***)               (-2.60***)                 (-2.64***) 
                       + 0.3807 INSTjt + 0.0471 ANAjt + 0.2867 BIG4jt                                  (6) 
                                           (4.50***)                     (2.01**)                    (7.31***) 
+ 0.1630 NASjt + 0.5906 NBIGmt + 0.0244 WAGEmt + Industry Indicators 
                                          (2.85***)                   (30.59***)                       (5.07***) 
where the subscripts, j m, and t denote an individual client firm, an MSA, and time, 
respectively, and the numbers in parentheses denote z-statistics. The superscript 
***
 (
**
) 
denotes a p-value of less than 1% (5%) in two-tailed tests, respectively. The variable 
DMSA
*
 represents the likelihood that a client chooses a local auditor, and is ex post set to 
equal one if the local audit office is located in the same MSA where the client firm is 
headquartered, and zero otherwise. The exact definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table 1. 
The results of the above probit estimation show that all the coefficients on 
significant variables have expected signs. The explanatory power of the model, measured 
by pseudo-R
2
, is 17.46%, suggesting that the model explains the choice between local 
versus non-local auditors reasonably well. In the second stage, we estimate Eqs. (4) and 
(5) after adding the inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA), obtained from the first-stage probit 
estimation as an additional control variable. Untabulated results from the second-stage 
regressions show that the coefficients of the variables of interest remain qualitatively 
                                                 
25
 Because of the concern over the efficacy of the first-stage selection model (Francis and Lennox 2008), we 
include various variables in the first-stage model that are not in the second stage. Furthermore, when we 
check the variance inflation factor (VIF) in the second-stage regressions, as Francis and Lennox (2008) 
recommend, we find that the VIF values are mostly very small. We also considered a number of additional 
variables that are not included in our final model, but we find that the coefficients of these variables are 
insignificant and that adding these variables does not improve the model’s explanatory power.  
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identical with those reported in Tables 4 and 5. All statistical inferences remain unchanged 
with this two-stage treatment effect approach.
26
 In short, the above results suggest that our 
reported results are robust to the potential self-selection bias associated with local versus 
non-local auditor choices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While many studies have already examined the effect of geographic proximity in 
the contexts of domestic and international portfolio decisions, analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
and other areas of finance and accounting research, little attention has been paid to the 
issue in the context of the auditor–client relationship. Our results show that auditor–client 
geographic proximity or auditor locality has a positive impact on audit quality by 
constraining opportunistic earnings management or improving accrual quality. We also 
find that this impact is relatively weaker or absent for diversified firms with more 
operating or geographic segments. 
These results help us better understand why local audits are so prevalent and Big 4 
audit firms have continuously expanded their practicing offices to cities in which their 
clients are headquartered. Furthermore, this study will be of interest to regulators, since it 
demonstrates that the proximity of auditors to clients can be beneficial to audit quality. 
As in many other studies, we measure audit quality using accrual-based proxies. 
We admit, however, that the accrual-based proxies are not the only valid empirical 
measures of audit quality and that these measures are often criticized for inherent 
                                                 
26
 For example, when we perform a two-stage analysis for the regression in column (2a) of Table 4, the 
coefficient on DMSA is -0.0112 (t = -2.44) and that on DMSA*LNBGS is 0.0086 (t = 2.46). When we 
perform a two-stage analysis for the regression in column (1a) of Table 5, the coefficient on DMSA is -
0.0024 (t = -1.65) and that on DMSA*LNBGS is 0.0014 (t = 1.71). While the F-tests using the 50th, 75th, or 
99th percentile value of LNBGS (similar to those reported in the bottom three rows of Tables 4 and 5) yield 
all insignificant results, the F-tests using the 25th percentile value of LNBGS yield significant results. 
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measurement errors, although we use several advanced approaches to alleviate this 
concern. We therefore recommend continued research using alternative measures of audit 
quality to further validate our findings and better understand the role of auditor locality in 
shaping the auditor–client relationship. 
[INSERT APPENDIX HERE!]
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   APPENDIX 
 
In Panel A, column (1) reports the number of clients (firm–year observations) in each MSA where 
more than 100 clients are located. Column (2) reports the number of local audits performed by the 
audit offices located in each MSA for the clients located in the same MSA. Column (3) reports the 
percentage of local audits out of the total number of clients in each MSA. Panel B reports the 
number of observations by the distance between auditor and client when they are not located in the 
same MSA. Panel C provides a more detailed breakdown of clients located in the New York–
Northern New Jersey–Long Island MSA. Column (1) shows the number of clients that hire 
auditors from different MSAs. Column (2) shows the average distance of the clients and their 
respective auditors. 
 
Panel A: Number of observations by the location of clients 
 
MSA  
(1) 
Number of 
clients 
(2) 
Number of 
local audits 
(3) 
Percentage 
[(2)/(1)] 
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island 1,691 1,434 85 
San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose 1,282 1,203 94 
Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County 786 705 87 
Boston–Worcester–Lawrence 751 698 93 
Chicago–Gary–Kenosha 491 459 93 
Houston–Galveston–Brazoria 499 426 85 
Dallas–Fort Worth 443 385 87 
Washington–Baltimore 410 355 87 
Minneapolis–St. Paul 402 379 94 
Philadelphia–Wilmington–Atlantic City 376 288 77 
Atlanta 331 275 83 
San Diego 322 223 69 
Denver–Boulder–Greeley 297 266 90 
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 191 144 75 
Seattle–Tacoma–Bremerton 191 172 90 
Cleveland–Akron 168 156 93 
St. Louis 165 142 86 
Phoenix–Mesa 159 128 81 
Detroit–Ann Arbor–Flint 147 121 82 
Portland–Salem  132 119 90 
Pittsburgh 131 104 79 
Milwaukee–Racine 122 99 81 
Others (all combined) 2,952 1,715 58 
Number of clients audited by auditors in the same MSA 9,996 (80%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors from different MSAs 2,443 (20%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors within 100 kilometers 10,366 (83%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors farther than 100 kilometers 2,073 (17%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors within 100 kilometers but 
not in the same MSA 
432 (3%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors not within 100 kilometers 
but in the same MSA 
62 (0.5%) 
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Appendix (continued) 
 
Panel B: Distance between auditor and client when they are not located in the same MSA 
Distance 
0– 
100 km 
100– 
250 km 
250– 
500 km 
500– 
1,000 km 
1,000–
2,000 km 
2,000 km 
or more 
Total 
Number of 
Observations 
432 662 324 275 380 370 2,443 
 
Panel C: Locations of auditors for clients in the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long 
Island MSA  
MSA where auditors are located 
(1) 
Number of 
observations 
(2) 
Average 
Distance 
(kilometers) 
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island 1,434 24 
Hartford 55 69 
Boston–Worcester–Lawrence 38 275 
Philadelphia–Wilmington–Atlantic City 18 73 
San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose 12 4,120 
Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County 11 3,949 
Minneapolis–St. Paul 11 1,640 
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 9 1,708 
Indianapolis 8 1,055 
Washington–Baltimore 7 287 
Denver–Boulder–Greeley 6 2,644 
Oklahoma City 6 2,131 
Providence–Fall River–Warwick 6 137 
Albany–Schenectady–Troy 5 179 
Birmingham 5 1,379 
Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock Hill 5 840 
Cleveland–Akron 5 653 
San Diego 5 3,917 
West Palm Beach–Boca Raton 5 1,662 
Other MSAs (16 MSAs combined) 40 - 
Number of clients audited by auditors in the same MSA 1,434 (85%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors from different MSAs 257 (15%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors within 100 kilometers 1,479 (87%) 
Number of clients audited by auditors farther than 100 kilometers 212 (13%) 
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Table 1 Variable Definition and Measurement  
(continued on next page) 
 
|DA| 
 
= 
 
Absolute value of discretionary (abnormal) accruals. The current study uses two 
proxies: DA1 and DA2, where DA1 is abnormal accruals as measured by Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2006) method; DA2 is performance-matched abnormal accruals 
as measured by Kothari et al.’s (2005) method. 
 
AQ = Accrual quality, where AQ1 is the accrual quality as measured by Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) method; AQ2 comprises discretionary components of accrual 
quality as measured by Francis et al.’s (2005) method. 
 
DLOCAL = Indicator variable for auditor location. We use two proxies, DMSA and D100, 
where DMSA is one if the audit office and client firm’s headquarters are located 
in the same MSA, and zero otherwise; D100 is one if the distance between the 
audit office and the client firm’s headquarters is less than 100 kilometers from 
the client firm’s headquarter or if the audit office and the client firms’ 
headquarters are located in the same MSA, and zero otherwise. 
 
LNBGS = Natural log of the sum of the number of business and geographic segments 
minus one. If business or geographic segment data are missing for a given 
observation from Compustat, we assign it a value of one. Thus, the minimum 
value of LNBGS is zero (i.e., log(2 - 1) = 0). 
 
LNTA = Natural log of total assets in thousands of dollars. 
 
BIG4 = One if the auditor is one of the Big 4 firms, and zero otherwise. 
 
TENURE = Auditor tenure, measured as the natural log of the number of years the incumbent 
auditor has served the client firm. 
 
NAS = Relative importance of non-audit services, measured as the ratio of the natural 
log of non-audit fees over the natural log of total fees. 
 
INDSPEC = An indicator variable for auditor industry expertise that equals one if the audit 
firm is the industry leader for the audit year in the audit market of the MSA 
where the auditor is located, and zero otherwise. We calculate each audit firm’s 
industry market share of audit fees for an MSA as the proportion of audit fees 
earned by each firm in the total audit fees earned by all audit firms in the MSA 
that serve the same industry. Each industry is defined based on two-digit SIC 
codes. 
 
CHGSALE  = Change in sales deflated by lagged total assets. 
 
BTM = Book-to-market ratio, winsorized at zero and four. 
 
LOSS   = One if the firm reports a loss for the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
LEV = Leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
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ZMIJ = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress score, winsorized at five and minus five. 
ISSUE = One if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past three years is more than 
5% of the total assets, and zero otherwise.  
CFO = Operating cash flows, taken from the cash flow statement, deflated by lagged 
total assets. 
LAGACCR  = One-year lagged total accruals. Accruals are defined as income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows from the statement of cash flow 
deflated by lagged total assets.  
CONCENT = A measure of auditor concentration by each MSA, measured by the Herfindahl 
index of the number of clients for each audit office. 
 
OPCYCLE = Length of the operating cycle, the log of the sum of a firm’s days accounts 
receivable and days inventory. 
STD_CFO = Cash flow variability, the standard deviation of a firm’s rolling five-year cash 
flows from operations, scaled by averaged total assets.  
STD_SALES = Sales variability, the standard deviation of a firm’s rolling five-year sales 
revenues, scaled by averaged total assets. 
 
LNSALES = Natural log of sales.  
NEGEAR   = Inventory and receivables divided by total assets.  
GCM = One if the firm receives a going concern audit opinion in the current year, and 
zero otherwise. 
CAIN = Capital intensity measured by long-term assets divided by total assets. 
NBIG = Number of Big 4 audit offices in the MSA. 
WAGE = Mean hourly auditor wage in the client firm’s MSA, from Occupational 
Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
ANA = Natural log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm. 
INST = Natural log of one plus the percentage of institutional shareholdings. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Results of Univariate Tests 
 DMSA = 1
a
 DMSA = 0
 b
 Test for 
Equality 
(t-value) Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
│DA 1│ 0.0846 0.0473 0.1062 0.1046 0.0570 0.1333 -7.90*** 
│DA 2│ 0.1105 0.0737 0.1077 0.1262 0.0847 0.1209 -6.29*** 
AQ1 0.0446 0.0351 0.0330 0.0493 0.0385 0.0356 -4.42*** 
AQ2 -0.0004 -0.0039 0.0257 0.0016 -0.0029 0.0278 -2.46** 
 
 D100 = 1
c
 D100 = 0
 d
 Test for 
Equality 
(t-value) Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
│DA 1│ 0.0848 0.0476 0.1068 0.1078 0.0590 0.1360 -8.44*** 
│DA 2│ 0.1108 0.0739 0.1080 0.1277 0.0855 0.1225 -6.26*** 
AQ1 0.0448 0.0351 0.0334 0.0495 0.0395 0.0344 -4.03*** 
AQ2 -0.0003 -0.0040 0.0261 0.0018 -0.0026 0.0262 -2.28** 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Variables
 e
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
│DA 1│ 0.0885 0.1123 0.0001 0.0198 0.0490 0.1122 0.5444 
│DA 2│ 0.1136 0.1106 0.0010 0.0328 0.0761 0.1588 0.4748 
AQ1 0.0454 0.0335 0.0066 0.0224 0.0357 0.0587 0.1745 
AQ2 0 0.0261 -0.0498 -0.0149 -0.0037 0.0099 0.0968 
LNBGS 0.9170 0.7692 0 0 1.0986 1.6094 2.4849 
LNTA 12.2340 2.1814 7.4972 10.7087 12.2428 13.6899 17.3259 
BIG4 0.7686 0.4217 0 1 1 1 1 
TENURE 1.8410 0.9115 0 1.3863 1.9459 2.4849 3.4965 
NAS 0.6698 0.2649 0 0.5895 0.7543 0.8523 0.9355 
INDSPEC 0.4405 0.4965 0 0 0 1 1 
CHGSALE 0.1035 0.4827 -0.8534 -0.0176 0.0613 0.1937 1.4570 
BTM 0.5736 0.6060 0 0.2245 0.4249 0.7220 3.6553 
LOSS 0.4044 0.4908 0 0 0 1 1 
LEV 0.5273 0.4565 0.0481 0.2704 0.4612 0.6519 2.2089 
ZMIJ -1.2567 2.0870 -4.5345 -2.7215 -1.5831 -0.3322 5.0000 
ISSUE 0.4948 0.4943 0 0 0 1 1 
CFO 0.0300 0.2427 -0.8780 -0.0140 0.0722 0.1399 0.4369 
LAGACCR -0.0976 0.2977 -0.8618 -0.1315 -0.0698 -0.0248 0.3348 
CONCENT 0.1738 0.0964 0.0702 0.1138 0.1563 0.2240 0.5000 
OPCYCLE 4.7492 0.6902 2.3195 4.4296 4.8192 5.1642 6.1768 
STD_CFO 0.0734 0.0692 0.0080 0.0323 0.0554 0.0899 0.3412 
STD_SALE 0.2015 0.1985 0.0166 0.0853 0.1485 0.2550 0.9261 
Here ***, **, and * denote p-values of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, with two-tailed tests, respectively. 
a The sample size is 9,996 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 5,408 firm–year observations for AQ1 and AQ2. 
b The sample size is 2,443 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 1,232 firm–year observations for AQ1 and AQ2. 
c The sample size is 10,428 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 5,687 firm–year observations for AQ1 and AQ2. 
d The sample size is 2,011 for │DA 1│ and │DA 2│and 953 firm–year observations for AQ1 and AQ2. 
e The sample size is 12,439 for │DA 1│, │DA 2│, and 15 variables from LNBGS to CONCENT, and 6,640 firm–
year observations for AQ1, AQ2, and the other three variables from OPCYCLE to STD_SALE. 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Pearson Correlations between Discretionary Accruals, Auditor Locality, and Control Variables 
 │DA1│ │DA2│ DMSA D100 LN-
BGS 
LNTA BIG4 TEN-
URE 
NAS IND-
SPEC 
CHG-
SALE 
BTM LOSS LEV ZMIJ ISSUE CFO LAG-
ACCR 
│DA2│ 0.445 
(<0.01) 
 
                 
DMSA -0.071 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.056 
(<0.01) 
                
D100 -0.076 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.056 
(<0.01) 
0.888 
(<0.01) 
               
LN-
BGS 
-0.141 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.131 
(<0.01) 
0.061 
(<0.01) 
0.068 
(<0.01) 
              
LNTA -0.319 
(<0.01) 
-0.305 
(<0.01) 
0.127 
(<0.01) 
 
0.122 
(<0.01) 
0.362 
(<0.01) 
             
BIG4 -0.212 
(<0.01) 
-0.195 
(<0.01) 
0.163 
(<0.01) 
0.173 
(<0.01) 
0.197 
(<0.01) 
0.547 
(<0.01) 
 
            
TEN-
URE 
-0.098 
(<0.01) 
-0.077 
(<0.01) 
0.045 
(<0.01) 
0.042 
(<0.01) 
0.116 
(<0.01) 
0.253 
(<0.01) 
0.287 
(<0.01) 
 
           
NAS -0.144 
(<0.01) 
-0.148 
(<0.01) 
0.097 
(<0.01) 
0.099 
(<0.01) 
0.222 
(<0.01) 
0.436 
(<0.01) 
0.357 
(<0.01) 
0.224 
(<0.01) 
 
          
INDS-
PEC 
-0.118 
(<0.01) 
-0.106 
(<0.01) 
-0.020 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.798) 
0.092 
(<0.01) 
0.318 
(<0.01) 
0.304 
(<0.01) 
0.132 
(<0.01) 
 
0.157 
(<0.01) 
         
CHG-
SALE 
0.028 
(<0.01) 
0.002 
(0.870) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
0.013 
(0.162) 
0.001 
(0.992) 
0.064 
(<0.01) 
0.012 
(0.19) 
 
0.010 
(0.27) 
0.026 
(<0.01) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
        
BTM -0.083 
(<0.01) 
0.138 
(<0.01) 
-0.035 
(<0.01) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.009 
(0.295) 
-0.065 
(<0.01) 
-0.042 
(<0.01) 
-0.034 
(<0.01) 
-0.021 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(0.19) 
-0.124 
(<0.01) 
 
  
 
     
LOSS 0.256 
(<0.01) 
0.198 
(<0.01) 
-0.063 
(<0.01) 
-0.069 
(<0.01) 
-0.135 
(<0.01) 
-0.360 
(<0.01) 
-0.171 
(<0.01) 
-0.127 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.168 
(<0.01) 
-0.134 
(<0.01) 
-0.178 
(<0.01) 
0.086 
(<0.01) 
      
LEV 0.151 
(<0.01) 
0.079 
(<0.01) 
-0.071 
(<0.01) 
-0.083 
(<0.01) 
-0.024 
(<0.01) 
-0.068 
(<0.01) 
-0.131 
(<0.01) 
-0.038 
(<0.01) 
-0.061 
(<0.01) 
0.012 
(0.19) 
-0.085 
(<0.01) 
-0.187 
(<0.01) 
0.153 
(<0.01) 
 
     
(continued on next page) 
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ZMIJ 0.238 
<(0.01) 
 
-0.138 
(<0.01) 
-0.090 
(<0.01) 
-0.104 
(<0.01) 
-0.076 
(<0.01) 
-0.142 
(<0.01) 
-0.147 
(<0.01) 
-0.078 
(<0.01) 
-0.098 
(<0.01) 
-0.013 
(0.16) 
-0.128 
(<0.01) 
-0.181 
(<0.01) 
0.433 
(<0.01) 
0.761 
(<0.01) 
    
ISSUE 0.081 
(<0.01) 
0.053 
(<0.01) 
-0.049 
(<0.01) 
-0.053 
(<0.01) 
-0.056 
(<0.01) 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
-0.033 
(<0.01) 
-0.030 
(<0.01) 
-0.031 
(<0.01) 
0.003 
(0.73) 
0.093 
(<0.01) 
-0.134 
(<0.01) 
0.099 
(<0.01) 
0.151 
(<0.01) 
 
0.244 
(<0.01) 
   
CFO -0.273 
(<0.01) 
-0.072 
(<0.01) 
0.061 
(<0.01) 
0.068 
(<0.01) 
0.163 
(<0.01) 
0.369 
(<0.01) 
0.179 
(<0.01) 
0.083 
(<0.01) 
0.191 
(<0.01) 
0.113 
(<0.01) 
0.124 
(<0.01) 
0.043 
(<0.01) 
-0.502 
(<0.01) 
-0.119 
(<0.01) 
-0.421 
(<0.01) 
-0.189 
(<0.01) 
 
  
LAG-
ACCR 
-0.122 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.216 
(<0.01) 
0.034 
(<0.01) 
0.035 
(<0.01) 
0.053 
(<0.01) 
0.101 
(<0.01) 
0.070 
(<0.01) 
0.043 
(<0.01) 
0.062 
(<0.01) 
0.041 
(<0.01) 
0.035 
(<0.01) 
0.051 
(<0.01) 
-0.139 
(<0.01) 
-0.163 
(<0.01) 
-0.078 
(<0.01) 
-0.078 
(<0.01) 
0.175 
(<0.01) 
 
CON-
SERV 
-0.054 
(<0.01) 
-0.082 
(<0.01) 
-0.031 
(<0.01) 
-0.014 
(0.117) 
0.026 
(<0.01) 
0.046 
(<0.01) 
0.078 
(<0.01) 
0.040 
(<0.01) 
0.085 
(<0.01) 
0.243 
(<0.01) 
-0.012 
(0.170) 
0.041 
(<0.01) 
-0.049 
(<0.01) 
-0.041 
(<0.01) 
-0.049 
(<0.01) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
0.029 
(0.001) 
 
0.015 
(0.087) 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations between Accrual Quality, Auditor Locality, and Control Variables 
 AQ1 
 
AQ2 DMSA D100 LNBGS LNTA BIG4 OPCYCLE STD_CFO STD_SALE NAS INDSPEC ZMIJ 
AQ2 0.779 
(<0.01) 
 
            
DMSA -0.054 
(<0.01) 
-0.030 
(0.014) 
 
           
D100 -0.049 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
0.858 
(<0.01) 
          
LNBGS -0.131 
(<0.01) 
0.020 
(0.099) 
 
0.033 
(<0.01) 
0.046 
(<0.01) 
         
LNTA 
 
-0.452 
(<0.01) 
-0.020 
(0.104) 
 
0.099 
(<0.01) 
0.079 
(<0.01) 
0.347 
(<0.01) 
        
BIG4 -0.240 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.035 
(<0.01) 
0.118 
(<0.01) 
0.132 
(<0.01) 
0.210 
(<0.01) 
0.520 
(<0.01) 
       
OPCYCLE 0.156 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.002 
(0.861) 
0.011 
(0.359) 
0.161 
(<0.01) 
-0.140 
(<0.01) 
-0.062 
(<0.01) 
      
(continued on next page) 
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STD_CFO 0.542 
(<0.01) 
 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.026 
(0.033) 
-0.020 
(0.108) 
-0.186 
(<0.01) 
-0.411 
(<0.01) 
0.184 
(<0.01) 
0.101 
(<0.01) 
     
STD_ 
SALE 
0.317 
(<0.01) 
 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.024 
(0.054) 
-0.037 
(<0.01) 
-0.112 
(<0.01) 
-0.225 
(<0.01) 
-0.134 
(<0.01) 
-0.128 
(<0.01) 
0.344 
(<0.01) 
    
NAS -0.169 
(<0.01) 
 
0.022 
(0.070) 
0.048 
(<0.01) 
0.044 
(<0.01) 
0.189 
(<0.01) 
0.436 
(<0.01) 
0.341 
(<0.01) 
0.001 
(0.934) 
-0.166 
(<0.01) 
-0.089 
(<0.01) 
   
INDSPEC -0.202 
(<0.01) 
 
-0.047 
(<0.01) 
-0.041 
(<0.01) 
-0.017 
(0.159) 
0.112 
(<0.01) 
0.334 
(<0.01) 
0.308 
(<0.01) 
-0.105 
(<0.01) 
-0.149 
(<0.01) 
-0.081 
(<0.01) 
0.190 
(<0.01) 
  
ZMIJ 0.114 
(<0.01) 
 
0.077 
(<0.01) 
-0.064 
(<0.01) 
-0.081 
(<0.01) 
0.009 
(0.486) 
0.034 
(<0.01) 
-0.031 
(<0.01) 
-0.130 
(<0.01) 
0.087 
(<0.01) 
0.074 
(<0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.856) 
0.046 
(<0.01) 
 
CFO -0.251 
(<0.01) 
 
0.052 
(<0.01) 
0.040 
(<0.01) 
0.047 
(<0.01) 
0.078 
(<0.01) 
0.312 
(<0.01) 
0.168 
(<0.01) 
-0.192 
(<0.01) 
-0.359 
(<0.01) 
-0.063 
(<0.01) 
0.181 
(<0.01) 
0.124 
(<0.01) 
-0.411 
(<0.01) 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Association between Auditor Locality and Clients’ Discretionary Accruals 
 
  Section A 
Using |DA1| as the Dependent Variable  
Section B 
Using |DA2| as the Dependent 
Variable  
 Expected 
Sign 
(1a) 
DLOCAL = 
DMSA 
(2a) 
DLOCAL = 
DMSA 
(3a) 
DLOCAL = 
D100 
(4a) 
DLOCAL = 
D100 
(1b) 
DLOCAL = 
DMSA 
(2b) 
DLOCAL = 
D100 
DLOCAL - -0.0046 
(-1.77*) 
-0.0119 
(-2.75***) 
-0.0050 
(-1.73*) 
-0.0121 
(-2.58***) 
-0.0090 
(-2.26**) 
 
-0.0083 
(-1.97**) 
LNBGS ? -0.0053 
(-3.68***) 
-0.0121 
(-3.72***) 
 
-0.0053 
(-3.67***) 
-0.0124 
(-3.42***) 
-0.0096 
(-2.98***) 
 
-0.0102 
(-2.97***) 
DLOCAL*LN
BGS 
+ - 0.0086 
(2.45**) 
 
- 0.0086 
(2.24**) 
0.0062 
(1.78*) 
 
0.0066 
(1.82*) 
LNTA - -0.0106 
(-14.44***) 
-0.0106 
(-14.48***) 
-0.0106 
(-14.46***) 
-0.0106 
(-14.49***) 
-0.0107 
(-15.08***) 
 
-0.0107 
(-15.11***) 
BIG4 - -0.0131 
(-3.96***) 
-0.0129 
(-3.90***) 
-0.0130 
(-3.94***) 
-0.0128 
(-3.88***) 
-0.0120 
(-3.78***) 
 
-0.0121 
(-3.80***) 
TENURE 
 
- 0.0003 
(0.29) 
0.0002 
(0.16) 
0.0003 
(0.27) 
0.0002 
(0.14) 
 
0.0015 
(1.26) 
0.0015 
(1.25) 
NAS 
 
? 0.0064 
(1.27) 
0.0069 
(1.38) 
0.0064 
(1.27) 
0.0068 
(1.35) 
 
-0.0017 
(-0.36) 
-0.0018 
(-0.39) 
INDSPEC - 0.0008 
(0.38) 
0.0008 
(0.36) 
0.0009 
(0.41) 
0.0008 
(0.36) 
0.0027 
(1.24) 
 
0.0028 
(1.27) 
CHGSALE + 0.0200 
(4.11***) 
0.0201 
(4.13***) 
0.0200 
(4.10***) 
0.0200 
(4.10***) 
 
0.0085 
(2.60***) 
0.0085 
(2.58***) 
 
BTM - -0.0112 
(-5.32***) 
-0.0112 
(-5.33***) 
-0.0111 
(-5.30***) 
-0.0111 
(-5.31***) 
-0.0117 
(-5.90***) 
 
-0.0117 
(-5.87***) 
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LOSS + 0.0155 
(5.59***) 
0.0156 
(5.62***) 
0.0155 
(5.58***) 
0.0155 
(5.61***) 
0.0121 
(4.70***) 
 
0.0120 
(4.68***) 
LEV + 0.0068 
(0.87) 
0.0067 
(0.86) 
0.0068 
(0.87) 
0.0067 
(0.86) 
0.0063 
(1.31) 
 
0.0063 
(1.31) 
ZMIJ + 0.0050 
(3.04***) 
0.0051 
(3.05***) 
 
0.0050 
(3.04***) 
0.0051 
(3.05***) 
0.0007 
(0.59) 
 
0.0007 
(0.60) 
ISSUE + 0.0002 
(0.08) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0001 
(0.07) 
0.0008 
(0.39) 
 
0.0008 
(0.41) 
CFO - -0.0420 
(-3.41***) 
-0.0417 
(-3.39***) 
-0.0419 
(-3.41***) 
-0.0417 
(-3.39***) 
-0.0302 
(-3.64***) 
 
-0.0301 
(-3.64***) 
LAGACCR - -0.0162 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0162 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0162 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0162 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0077 
(-1.87*) 
 
-0.0078 
(-1.88*) 
CONCENT - -0.0247 
(-2.55**) 
-0.0242 
(-2.52**) 
 
-0.0245 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0238 
(-2.47**) 
-0.0195 
(-2.02**) 
 
-0.0190 
(-1.98**) 
Intercept ? 0.2482 
(21.61***) 
0.2540 
(20.90***) 
 
0.2488 
(21.55***) 
0.2545 
(20.72***) 
0.2745 
(26.69***) 
0.2745 
(26.39***) 
Ind. & Year 
Indicators 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  12,439 12,439 12,439 12,439 12,439 12,439 
R
2
  0.1886 0.1891 0.1886 0.1891 0.1371 0.1371 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 1.0986)] = 0 
- F = 0.88 - F = 0.80 F = 0.66 F = 0.13 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 1.6094)] = 0 
- F = 0.34 - F = 0.23 F = 0.08 F = 0.42 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 2.4849)] = 0 
- F = 2.77 - F = 2.25 F = 1.18 F = 1.77 
This table reports the results of the regression in Eq. (4). All variables are as defined in Table 1. All reported t-statistics in parentheses are on an adjusted basis, 
using standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Here ***, **, and * denote p-values of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, with F-tests and two-tailed t-tests.
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Table 5 Association between Auditor Locality and Client Accrual Quality 
 
  Section A 
Using AQ1 as the Dependent 
Variable 
Section B 
Using AQ2 as the Dependent 
Variable 
 Expected 
Sign 
(1a) 
DLOCAL = 
DMSA 
(2a) 
DLOCAL = 
D100 
(1b) 
DLOCAL = 
DMSA 
(2b) 
DLOCAL = 
D100 
DLOCAL - -0.0027 
(-1.94*) 
 
-0.0029 
(-1.93*) 
-0.0031 
(-2.27**) 
-0.0030 
(-2.05**) 
LNBGS ? -0.0011 
(-1.64*) 
 
-0.0020 
(-1.67*) 
-0.0010 
(-1.59) 
 
-0.0010 
(-1.63) 
DLOCAL*
LNBGS 
+ 0.0018 
(1.76*) 
 
0.0026 
(1.92*) 
0.0016 
(1.71*) 
 
0.0017 
(1.84*) 
LNTA - -0.0041 
(-17.44***) 
 
-0.0041 
(-17.47***) 
-0.0006 
(-2.54**) 
-0.0006 
(-2.60***) 
BIG4 - -0.0009 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.0009 
(-0.80) 
-0.0018 
(-1.61) 
-0.0017 
(-1.60) 
OPCYCLE 
 
+ 0.0047 
(7.90***) 
0.0047 
(7.90***) 
0.0004 
(0.64) 
0.0004 
(0.63) 
 
STD_CFO 
 
+ 0.1745 
(15.78***) 
0.1747 
(15.81***) 
0.0004 
(0.04) 
0.0005 
(0.05) 
 
STD_SALE + 0.0227 
(8.20***) 
 
0.0226 
(8.19***) 
-0.0026 
(-0.98) 
-0.0027 
(-1.00) 
NAS ? 0.0023 
(1.34) 
 
0.0023 
(1.33) 
0.0030 
(1.77*) 
0.0030 
(1.76*) 
INDSPEC - -0.0025 
(-3.78***) 
 
-0.0025 
(-3.78***) 
-0.0022 
(-3.27***) 
-0.0021 
(-3.23***) 
ZMIJ + 0.0024 
(8.98***) 
 
0.0024 
(8.94***) 
0.0022 
(8.18***) 
0.0021 
(8.15***) 
CFO - 0.0112 
(3.01***) 
 
0.0112 
(3.02***) 
0.0222 
(6.51***) 
0.0223 
(6.52***) 
Intercept ? 0.0719 
(16.32***) 
0.0722 
(16.49***) 
0.0197 
(4.09***) 
 
0.0176 
(4.10***) 
Ind. & Year 
Indicators 
 Included Included Included Included 
N  6,640 6,640 6,640 6,640 
R
2
  0.4146 0.4146 0.0430 0.0428 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 1.0986)] = 0 
F = 1.53 F = 1.76 F = 3.30* F = 2.58 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 1.6094)] = 0 
F = 0.10 F = 0.17 F = 0.73 F = 0.50 
Test for 
[α1 + (α3 * 2.4849)] = 0 
F = 0.36 F = 0.29 F = 0.06 F = 0.09 
 
This table reports the results of the regression in Eq. (5). All variables are as defined in Table 1. All 
reported t-statistics in parentheses are on an adjusted basis, using standard errors corrected for clustering 
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at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Here ***, **, and * denote p-values less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, with F-tests and two-tailed t-tests. 
 
 
